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Abstract 
The investor protection and potential solutions for increasing its effectiveness have been subject to many and different approaches 
in scholarship literature. This study focuses on the empirical analysis of the major characteristics of governance on strength of 
investor protection. Thus, this paper employed the quantitative empirical analysis technique through the SPSS statistical packaged 
software, in order to evaluate the contribution of quality of governance to the ensuring the strength of investor protection, for a 
large sample of world-wide countries. In order to achieve the objective of the paper, a multiple regression analysis was performed 
from dual perspective, first from the geographical standpoint and second given by the income group classification. The research 
results confirm that the influence of governance on strength of investor protection cannot be neglected, even if strong differences 
emerge between different geographical areas and also between various income groups.    
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1. Introduction 
Achieving and ensuring an effective investor protection has always been a major topic of interest to accounting and 
finance academics, various practitioners and professional regulatory bodies in financial areas. A wide range of 
academic papers discuss different linkages that could be identified between various aspects of corporate governance 
and investor protection (see for example Matoussi and Jardak, 2012; Chen et al, 2009; La Porta et al., 2008; Volpin, 
2002; La Porta et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999a; La Porta et al., 1998, La Porta et al., 1997).  
In this study, our major goal is to explore the issue related to country-level governance and the extent this is highly 
relevant to investors, particularly for their protection. The effective investor protection has became one of major topic 
of interests for researchers from various interdisciplinary areas, particularly starting from the agency theory suggested 
re conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, 
therefore, one major purpose for governance at corporate level is to ensure protection for shareholders (investors) 
against potential expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders. As Chen et al (2009) admit, corporate 
governance represent a mechanism designed to support the reducing of agency costs, while Matoussi and Jardak 
(2012) assert that corporate governance along with mechanisms key 
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drivers of market development
corporate governance mechanisms and investor protection, while too few address the influence of governance at 
country-level on investor protection. On the other hand, as Hail and Leuz (2006) conclude, the mechanisms through 
governance at country-level offers legal protection of investors are still not so clear. Therefore, in this context, one 
major research question arises: Does governance at country-level influence the necessary protection for shareholders 
(investors)?  Thus, our intuition set at the beginning of this paper is that governance indicators (particularly, as they 
are defined by World Bank) have significant impact on investor protection; so that, our paper aims to empirically 
investigate the impact of governance clusters on strength of investor protection. 
This paper aims to provide a contribution to the literature by presenting, discussing and analyzing the potential 
impact that governance system and its major characteristics might have on the strength of investor protection, based on 
data and variables computed within the reports issued by a world-wide recognized professional organization such as 
World Bank.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to investor protection in 
general and to linkage between investor protection and governance in particular, and also presents the development of 
the basic empirical hypothesis tested within this study. Section 3 describes the research methodology used, variables 
and data sources employed for achieving the scientific objective proposed. In Section 4 the results of the cross-country 
investigation related to the influence of governance on investor protection are presented, discussed and analyzed. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses Development  
The investor protection is a matter of agency theory. No doubt, its significance is given by the necessity to ensure the 
equilibrium between those two main forces, namely the owners (investors) and the managers. But is it this balance 
ensured?  Volpin (2012) citing other researchers (such as Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk et al., 1998; Wolfenzon, 1998) 
considers that this balance is still far from being ensured, being more likely to assist to an increasing rather than a 
reduction of the agency problem. A large amount of research papers were focused on finding those potential reforms 
that are likely to enhance corporate governance in the context of agency theory (Matoussi and Jardak, 2012), while 
others studies aim to analyze empirically some of the casual factors that might explain cross-national diversity in 
developing of corporate governance mechanisms (Fligstein and Choo, 2005; Lich, 2005; Roe, 2005; Aguillera and 
Jackson, 2003; La Porta et al., 2002, 2000, 1999a, 1998 ).   
But as Matoussi and Jardak, (2012) state, these differences in corporate governance and effectiveness of investor 
protection measures continue to be persistent during the last decades, in spite of global trend for ensuring convergence 
in business and accounting practices. There is no question that the influence of legal environment, cultural and 
political factors at the cross-level governance on business and economic affairs cannot be anymore neglected.  
2.1. The influence of legal environment 
A significant amount of relevant research was conducted by well-known researchers such as La Porta, Lopez, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2002, 2000, 1999a, 1998, 1997). Their studies aim to investigate the problematic of investor 
protection around the world, trying to explain these cross-country differences, from various perspectives. A major 
contribution is assigned to the legal regime, in their vision, the legal system (including both laws and their 
key mechanism
 should be seen as an explaining factor of why 
than in . The role of legal system and its enforcement is also admitted by the founders of agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), starting from the premise that the rights of the investors should be protected by 
regulatory framework.  
In their analysis of cross-country diversity regarding the investor protection, La Porta et al., (2000) argue that the 
influences of political pressures and sometimes corruption at high-level are strongly felt. So that, a major question is 
arising: If private contracting is enough for ensuring proper investor protection?  As La Porta et al., (2000) show, 
research findings of different researchers reject the hypothesis that protection provided by private contracting is 
enough, while protection ensured through judicially enforced legal rules or government-enforced regulations seem to 
be more effective.   
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Trying to explain the differences in ensuring the investor protection around the world, La Porta et al., (1999a, 2000) 
develop a complex analysis for a large sample of 49 world countries, classifying them depending on their legal origins. 
In their vision, the major groups of legal systems according to their legal origin are: Common law (18 countries), 
French civil law (21 countries), German civil law (6 countries), and Scandinavian civil law (4 countries). One of their 
major conclusion is that countries with common law origins benefit from a more protective regulatory framework for 
investors, than civil law countries, where laws seems to be less protective for investors. But, as Matoussi and Jardak, 
(2012) remark, following the world famous Enron scandal and other bankruptcies that followed leaded to serious 
concerns about investor protection in the US, one of the major countries from common law category, which also could 
rise In this direction, a significant contribution is 
given by recent studies (Matoussi and Jardak, 2012) that try to find reliable answers to the urgent necessity to validate 
The results obtained by Matouzzi and Jardak (2012) achieve to confirm that a combination of legal, 
cultural and political factors still could be considered as one of the significant explanation for the diversity concerning 
the investor protection around the world.  
2.2. The influence of political factor  
The impact of political factor on legal system and consequently on investor protection cannot be ignored, therefore 
many scholarships address this controversial topic in their researches, expanding the influence of political factors on 
corporate governance beyond the legal system.  Thus, academics such as Berglof and von Thadden (1999), Rajan and 
Zingales (1999), Roe (2003, 2005) promote the idea that political influence is strongly felt on corporate governance 
system and not always through channels such as regulatory framework. In the same vein, Gourevitch (2003, 2005) 
includes in the category of channels though political influences corporate governance and investor protection other 
variables such as interest group preferences and potential coalitions between owners, managers and workers and 
political institutions. In opinion of Gourevitch (2003) the impact of politics on corporate governance, in the way 
political group interest deal with regulators was quite neglected by academic literature in the field of corporate 
governance.  
On the other hand, even if La Porta et al. (2000) agree that the hypothesis mentioned above might be true, they still 
consider that legal system is one of the major instrument through politics influences corporate governance and so that 
investor protection. This opinion was also validated by their latter study (La Porta et al., 2008) where their results 
confirm the fact that cultural and political perspectives provide sufficient influences on legal system, which could also 
explain the diversity of economic consequences across world-wide countries.  
A complex analysis over the impact of legal system, cultural and political variables was developed by Matoussi and 
protection across countries. The findings of Matoussi and Jardak show that determinant factors for the disparity of 
investor protection are given by legal origin and cultural factors, while political dimensions are emphasized as having 
a direct-only effect only on market capitalization.  
 
2.3. The impact of government performance and control of corruption 
The quality of government and its impact on corporate governance and investor protection is also another relevant 
factor that should be taken in consideration. Proceeding to an analysis of the determinants of government effectiveness 
in a large sample of countries, La Porta et al. (1999b) consider as proxies for government effectiveness, the control of 
corruption and the bureaucratic delays, showing that civil law countries are characterised sa being more interventionist 
than common law countries, and one consequence is the inferior level of investor protection due to the 
interventionism.    
The government effectiveness is even more significant, especially if we consider one principle for successful 
investor protection, highlighted by Glaeser et al. (2001) that a proper government regulation of financial markets could 
be useful in case of some countries where private contracting is not enough, or is influenced by various cultural and 
political interferences.  
Licht et al. (2002, 2005) analyzing the impact of cultural factor on disparity on investor protection shows that 
cultural environment existing in many developing and transition economies and where investor protection cannot be 
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protected within a proper court system, may lead to a general non-compliance with the applicable law, also 
accompanied by a high level of corruption or ineffective reform for the control of corruption.  
Considering the prior literature background presented above, it can be easily concluded that there are few broad 
areas in which governance has been shown to matter for the investor protection such as regulatory framework, which 
contains both regulatory quality and rule of law; political system; government effectiveness and control of corruption.  
Having in mind the stated objective at the beginning of our paper, but also the results of prior literature background, 
for capturing the relevant dimensions of governance, our opinion is that governance clusters developed by World Bank 
within t Worldwide Governance Indicators
proper for our goal. Having the advantage that they are dimensioned for more than 200 economies during period 1996-
2011, these governance indicators express the major characteristics that an effective country-governance system 
should have.  
 
Summing up the above prior mentioned research papers in this area, but also considering the purpose of this paper, the 
present study considers one relevant research hypothesis. Hence, the basic empirical hypothesis to be tested in this 
paper is the following: 
 
Basic Hypothesis. All six clusters of country-level governance (1.Voice and Accountability; 2. Political Stability and 
absence of violence; 3.Government effectiveness; 4.Regulatory Quality; 5. Rule of Law; 6. Control of Corruption) are 
positively related to strength of investor protection.  
 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Research goal 
As we stated at the beginning of our paper, this paper aims to investigate the potential relationship that might be 
identified between quality of governance system measured through some relevant indicators and strength of investor 
protection, seeking to develop this empirical analysis from two perspectives, from geographical one and from the 
perspective given by the classification of world economies on income groups. To test the basis hypothesis established 
an empirical survey using three major datasets will be conducted, while the empirical analysis will be employed 
through the SPSS statistical packet program through multiple regression analysis.  
 
3.2. Sample and Data Collection 
First dataset used in this empirical survey was represented by the World Bank report The Worldwide Governance 
 where all six governance clusters are quantified for more than 200 economies, starting from the 
information provided by more than 40 data sources produced by over 30 various organizations worldwide, this 
database being updated on an annual basis since 2002. The main objective of this report is to measure the quality of 
governance through six governance aggregate indicators such as: 1.Voice and Accountability; 2.Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence; 3.Government Effectiveness; 4.Regulatory Quality; 5.Rule of Law and 6.Control of Corruption, 
while all these six aggregated indicators are developed based on the methodology described in their previous 
Aggregating Governance Indicators et al., 1999a). 
 
In order to have an objective evaluation of the strength of investor protection, second dataset used was given by the 
Doing Business 2012 Report The International Finance Corporation. This report is 
the ninth report in a series of annual reports that aim to provide an assessment of the regulatory framework that 
encourage business environment, also highlighting potential issues that could restrict it. The first Doing Business 
Report was published in 2003, covering 5 indicators and analyzing data from 133 economies, while the last one 
assesses 11 features of business regulatory framework and data for 183 economies, the initial goal of these reports 
being the same, namely, an objective basis for understanding and improving the regulatory environment 
The report included in our analysis refers to Doing Business 2012, where data presented cover the 
assessment of regulatory framework affecting domestic firms in 183 economies measured from June 2010 through 
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May 2011.  The variable used from this report is given by the strength of investor protection index, which, in fact, 
represents a ranking given by a simple average of the percentile ranking on its component indicators such as: 
transparency of related-party transactions (extend of disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (extend of director 
In 
realizing these assessments included in Doing Business reports, their authors used data coming from a survey of 
corporate and securities lawyers, using also securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules 
of evidence existing in each country analyzed, and having also as a point of reference the methodology developed by 
Djankov et al. (2002). This variable  strength of investor protection  is an index that ranges from 0 to 10, whereas 
higher values are corresponding to a more effective investor protection.  
As we mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the empirical analysis is developed from the perspective of 
geographical regions, but also from the perspective of classification of world economies on income groups. Thus, 
another dataset used in our survey was given by the Country and Lending Groups
2012, where all economies of all countries with population of more than 30,000 citizens are divided on income groups. 
Within this report, the world economies are divided on income groups such as low income, lower middle income, 
upper middle income, high income non OECD, high income OECD, according to the main criterion the gross national 
income (GNI) per capita, using the World Bank Atlas methodology. In our study, it was used the last version of this 
report issued on July 1, 2012, 2012 which is available until 1 July 2013. This income group classification is set each 
 
Considering the availability of the data for the period analyzed, the final sample used in our study uses data from 
140 countries.  
 
4. Empirical results 
According to the methodology described in the section above, multiple regression analysis was conducted to test 
the research proposed hypothesis. The results of multiple regression, applied from the perspective of geographical 
regions, are disclosed in Table 1 and 2, where the dependent variable is the strength of investor protection as it is 
measured by World Bank and The International Finance Corporation in their report Doing Business 2012 Report  
and the independent variables are materialised by all six governance clusters as they are defined and measured by 
World Bank in its report . 
Examining the results displayed in Table 1 and 2, it can be seen that all six governance clusters exert a significant 
influence on strength of investor protection, for the countries from Europe, Central and North America and South 
America. Thus, for those geographical regions, the results obtained are consistent with previous studies (Glaeser et al., 
2001; Gourevitch, 2003; Matouzzi and Jardak, 2012) confirming that a combination of legal, political factors and 
assessments of government effectiveness are relevant for ensuring an appropriate framework for the strength of 
investor protection.  
On the other hand, a different situation can be observed for the countries from Africa, where the research 
hypothesis stated above is not confirmed, a significant influence on strength of investor protection being highlighted 
only for , while the influence of the other five governance dimensions is not statistically 
relevant. Government effectiveness is an indicator that measures the perception over the inputs necessary for the 
effective governance, such as the ability of the state to provide and implement sound policies, quality of public service 
provision, the competence of civil servants, the level of bureaucracy, and the independence of civil services from 
political influences and the credibility of government. 
Also, a particular situation is also given by countries from Asia, where characteristics of governance such as 
and  are not emphasized as being relevant for African countries. In spite of the 
fact there are some studies (Aisen and Veiga, 2010) that argued the influence of political instability on economic 
growth, including adverse effects on investments, the results obtained for African countries are somehow consistent 
with the results of other studies (Perroti, 1996, , Mauro, 1985) who identified a negative 
correlation between political instability and business investments.   
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Table 1. Regression of the strength of investor protection on first three governance indicators  geographical regions 
Continent 
Voice and accountability Political Stability Government effectiveness 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Europe 
3,327 1,080 0,651 3,736 0,968 0,523 3,554 0,842 0,761 
(23,407)* (8,192)  (29,037)* (6,283)  (37,146)* (10,692)  
Central  
and North 
America 
3,970 0,809 0,467 4,198 0,890 0,427 4,185 0,654 0,532 
(23,568)* (3,373)  (26,575)* (3,110)  (29,315)* (3,848)  
South 
America  
3,854 0,630 0,593 4,088 0,391 0,327 4,021 0,578 0,575 
(34,174)* (3,413)  (26,052)* (1,972)  (35,362)* (3,288)  
Africa 
4,096 0,214 0,060 4,125 0,306 0,167 4,305 0,551 0,233 
(35,360) (1,471)  (40,202) (2,611)  (33,523)* (3,215)  
Asia 
4,328 0,019 0,000 4,453 0,361 0,250 4,251 0,606 0,473 
(29,773) (0,113)  (40,782) (3,510)  (49,183)* (5,768)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
 
Table 2. Regression of the strength of investor protection on last three governance indicators  geographical regions 
Continent 
Regulatory quality Rule of low Control of corruption 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Europe 
3,298 1,051 0,700 3,579 0,821 0,737 3,754 0,696 0,729 
(25,144)* (9,159)  (36,045)* (10,036)  (42,067)* (9,852)  
Central  
and North 
America 
3,926 0,886 0,604 4,299 0,632 0,566 4,254 0,620 0,473 
(26,846)* (4,453)  (30,944)* (4,117)  (28,032)* (3,419)  
South 
America  
4,016 0,479 0,709 4,134 0,465 0,667 4,001 0,459 0,648 
(42,930)* (4,415)  (37,944)* (4,004)  (39,039)* (3,835)  
Africa 
4,232 0,494 0,191 4,225 0,417 0,160 4,180 0,399 0,144 
(34,960) (2,830)  (33,385) (2,549)  (35,276) (2,388)  
Asia 
4,269 0,561 0,371 4,367 0,643 0,527 4,419 0,578 0,494 
(45,306)* (4,668)  (53,582)* (6,424)  (51,630)* (6,014)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
 
 
Going forward with our empirical analysis, and considering the same variables, it was employed the multiple 
regression analysis from the perspective of the income categories at global level, as they are defined from the 
relevant influence for all governance dimensions for countries included in the highest category of income, more 
. In our opinion, this result might be strongly correlated with the ones obtained 
from the geographical perspective, especially if we have in our mind the fact that from the total of 40 countries 
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 category, the major proportion of countries is represented by 24 countries from 
Europe.   
and  were not proved to be very 
surprising is the fact that  was proved to be more significant only for countries , 
and   categories, considering the indicators included in this cluster 
which express the potential likelihood that the government in exercise to be replaced through unconstitutional or 
violent methods and that could exert a negative influence on the business environment stability and also for strength of 
investors protection.  
 as  a governance indicator contains some indicators that estimate the extent to which public and 
citizens have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, containing the effectiveness of the judiciary systems and 
the security of property rights, it was empirically proved as relevant only for countries from highest income categories. 
Such a result could be explained by some features of countries included in lowest income categories, according to 
Gani and Duncan (2007), who state that 
 (Gani and Duncan, 2007), opinion also expressed by Bardhan (2002) who 
considers that the effectiveness of monitoring the performance of public services are much weaker in those countries.  
 
 
Table 3. Regression of the strength of investor protection on first three governance indicators  income group 
classification 
Income 
category 
Voice and accountability Political Stability Government effectiveness 
(Constant) Slope R  Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Low 
income 
3,715 -0,100 0,008 4,097 0,402 0,203 4,372 0,742 0,258 
(20,176) (-0,444)  (25,421)* (2,476)  (19,358)* 2,887  
Lower 
middle 
income 
3,894 0,003 0,000 3,869 -0,045 0,006 4,084 0,406 0,138 
(38,421) (0,018)  (36,838) (-0,40)  (33,410)* (2,081)  
Upper 
middle 
income 
4,066 0,206 0,056 4,106 0,285 0,107 4,048 0,716 0,322 
(40,502) (1,497)  (41,090)* (2,129)  (47,602)* (4,247)  
High 
income: 
non OECD 
4,887 -0,246 0,093 4,857 0,146 0,012 4,716 0,288 0,074 
(24,408) (-1,112)  (16,136) (0,386)  (15,551) (0,981)  
High 
income: 
OECD 
2,472 1,815 0,576 4,325 0,473 0,138 2,996 1,227 0,718 
(6,744)* (6,275)  (20,138)* (2,154)  (14,202)* (8,589)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
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Table 4. Regression of the strength of investor protection on last three governance indicators  income group 
classification 
Income 
category 
Regulatory quality Rule of low Control of corruption 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Low 
income 
3,878 0,151 0,013 4,269 0,571 0,176 4,304 0,698 0,257 
(18,825) (0,556)  (17,951) (2,264)  (20,998)* (2,882)  
Lower 
middle 
income 
3,967 0,250 0,050 4,145 0,431 0,146 4,007 0,204 0,036 
(37,827) (1,194)  (29,167) (2,145)  (28,204) (1,006)  
Upper 
middle 
income 
4,035 0,403 0,174 4,131 0,476 0,206 4,130 0,405 0,157 
(42,831)* (2,834)  (43,605)* (3,135)  (42,002) (2,665)  
High 
income: 
non 
OECD 
4,640 0,379 0,093 4,477 0,670 0,239 4,658 0,439 0,196 
(13,877) (1,110)  (14,989)* (1,940)  (18,885)* (1,713)  
High 
income: 
OECD 
2,976 1,306 0,615 2,964 1,246 0,715 3,691 0,751 0,687 
(11,146)* (6,808)  (13,717)* (8,524)  (25,202)* (7,970)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
 
5. Conclusions 
The empirical survey presented within this paper highlighted the relationship that might exist between governance 
dimensions as they are materialized within World Bank indicators and strength on investor protection, also captured 
by World Bank. This cross-country investigation revealed the fact that the most influencing governance characteristics 
on the strength of investor protection is the one related to the ability of government to provide sound and effective 
polices incorporated in G  indicator, from both geographical and income classification 
and were highlighted as 
being relevant mostly for well developed countries, from Europe and America, which are also included in the highest 
category of income groups. 
Major differences emerge between countries classified in low and lower middle income groups and countries  
classified in high income categories, when the ranking assigned to the strength of investor protection was regressed on 
each of the six governance clusters, one at a time. Thus, our research hypothesis could only partially be validated, 
being perfectly aware that an additional research on this topic is required to further explore the influence of 
governance dimensions on the strength of investor protection.  
The final conclusion of that article is that governance clusters exert an impact on business investments and its 
effectiveness, even if this influence is felt differently for countries from high income economies compared with the 
economies from lower income categories.  
Without claiming that this study provides a potential solution for enhancing the strength of investor protection, the 
value added of this paper could be materialized in the advancing of some thoughts on a potential way forward, 
especially if we consider the impact of governance dimensions on the investor protection. No doubt, both political 
leaders and representatives of business environment should collaborate in order to develop strong mechanisms that 
could enhance the governance characteristics which are really  protection. 
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